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	25 <b>X</b> 1
(as of 1100 EST, 10 February 1984)	5 <b>X</b> 1
LEBANON/SYRIA	5X1
there is no movement toward a political settlement. Druze leader Junblatt, and Barri, less aggressively,	25X1 25X1 25X1
Damascus press reports say the head of the Lebanese Communist Party has now called for Gemayel to step	25X1
Ambassador Bartholomew says Gemayel, encouraged by US military actions and by moderate statements by Muslim religious leaders, plans to stay on as president.	
Gemayel said he plans to name a six-member interim cabinet of technicianspossibly tomorrowtasked with getting Geneva II talks off the ground later this month. He claims he cannot name a prime minister for a "real" government of national unity until there is a solution to the situation in West Beirut.	<b>EV</b> 1
Gemayel and LAF Commander Tannous continue to press the US to support an Army offensive to block the infiltration route through the Alayh ridgeline.	5X1 25X1
area east of Beirut this morning probably in retaliation for the rocket attack yesterday on Metulla.	5X1 25X1
an impending Druze/Palestinian attack on Lebanese Army positions	25X1 5X1 X1
A Druze attack in the Kharrub would be impossible without 25 Israeli permission and Israel so far has vetoed any Druze move in the area, fearing it would result in the massacre 25	5X1 5X1 5X1
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IRAN-IRAQ WA	<u>ır</u>	
Tehran office coastal area Air Force bair involvement	cials to visit recently as of southeastern Iran. ase near Chah Bahar, he a	uld lea <u>d Tehran to "sto</u> p" the
PERSIAN GUL	<u> </u>	
consideration	ons that currently affec	very important" economic t Tokyo's reluctance to take
to be heavil prices) its risking Teh	ly discounting (around \$ oil in sales to the Jap can's ire by undertaking	anese at Kharg Island. By no a mediation effort, the
Japanese are oil while essuppliers.	e viewed as seeking to e hhancing their leverage	nsure their access to Iranian vis-a-vis other Gulf
security si	tuation following the mu y. Their French hosts h	yesterday to consider their rder of the UAE's chief envoy ave already tightened
on Wednesda	hut the sehesses describe	i siii go anean with a torma
protection,	but the ambassadors will "new, urgent measures."	

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	the UAI basis. probabl potenties Abu Dha	E (Sharj Securi ly unpro ially su s, and v abi by t	ah) is ty offi fitable bversiv isitors aking a	to comme cials in and see eSharj could m	nce tomor the UAE Tehran's ah is lik ove easil of the e	row on a view the primary to be ty from the	twice-wed venture a motive as lax in page to D	as s policing	2
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